Cornell University Law School

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

Fall 2003

The "Race to the Bottom" Returns: China's
Challenge to the International Labor Movement
Stephen F. Diamond
Cornell Law School, stephen-diamond@postoffice.law.cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Diamond, Stephen F., "The "Race to the Bottom" Returns: China's Challenge to the International Labor Movement" (2003). Cornell
Law Faculty Publications. 1582.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1582

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE "RACE TO THE BOTTOM" RETURNS: CHINA'S
CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR MOVEMENT

Stephen F. Diamond*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

I.
II.
III.

CHINESE TRADE UNIONISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARENA...................

V.

GLOBAL LABOR's ApPROACH TO CHINA................

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHINA'S ECONOMY AT A TURNING POINT..............

39
48
55
65
68

INTRODUcrION

In the early morning of March 3, 2003, two young women, Yao Dan
and Xiao Yu, were sitting in a Beijing hotel room when 20 officers of the
Chinese Public Security Bureau burst in and detained them. Their
crime? They were in Beijing to attempt to meet with the defense lawyer
representing Xiao Yu's father, Xiao Yunliang. Xiao Yunliang had been
tried several weeks earlier along with Yao Dan's father, Yao Fuxin, for
allegedly "subverting the political power of the [Chinese] state." Both
men were arrested in connection with their participation in a labor
protest that had occurred a year earlier in the industrial town of
Liaoyang in northeast China.' But that was not the reason given to the
women for their detention, according to the independent and widely
respected China Labour Bulletin of Hong Kong. 2 They were told,
absurdly, that the hotel they were staying in was "too shabby," and that

* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; Visiting
Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, 2003-2004; J.D., Yale, 1994; Ph.D.,
London, 1991; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1977. The author wishes to
acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Marilee Chan in the
preparation of this article.
1 Criminal Verdict: Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang (Intermediate People's Court
of Liaoyang Municipality, Liaoning Province, May 9, 2003) translated in The Liaoyang
Workers' Struggle: Portrait of a Movement, CHINA LAB. BULL., July 2003, at 71,
available at http://www.china-labour.org.hk (on file with author) [hereinafter
Liaoyang Workers' Struggle).
2 Descriptions of these events are found in Press Release, Human Rights in
China, Liaoyang Labor Activists' Daughters Detained (Mar. 3, 2003) and Liaoyang
Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 26.
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they would be taken to another hotel and allowed to meet with Xiao's
lawyer. Instead they were taken to yet another location in the city where
they were held while their possessions were searched. They were then
driven back to Liaoyang in a police van accompanied by eight police
officers, held separately in a government office and questioned for
several hours. Before their release, the police requested they sign a
doctored transcript of the interrogation including a statement that the
purpose of their visit to Beijing had been, "to talk to foreign news
media." Three months later the Intermediate People's Court of
Liaoyang Municipality duly announced that the fathers of both women
had been convicted of their "crime" and sentenced Yao to seven years,
and Xiao to four years, in prison with an additional two-year period for
each in which their "political rights" are to be suspended. 3
As it turned out, the women were probably mostly guilty of bad
timing. Their visit to Beijing happened to come just before the opening
of the Chinese National People's Congress and the National People's
Political Consultative Conference that were both engaged in sensitive
discussions and negotiations about the transfer of power to a new
generation of Chinese leaders.4 But why would that cause the police to
be so concerned about the attempt of these women to meet with the
lawyer representing one of their fathers? Was Beijing attempting to send
a signal about the right of counsel in the new China? No. It appears far
more likely that this event signals the fear and sense of fragility that grips
the Chinese leadership. The fathers of these two women had been active
in one of the most important worker protests among many thousands of
such protests that have swept through China in the last few years. When
originally arrested the two men were threatened with the death penalty.
Only an international campaign of solidarity and further protest by
fellow workers succeeded in getting the Chinese regime to reduce the
sentence. The convictions of these worker activists for engaging in what
much of the rest of the world would consider mild social protest, together
with the harassment of their families for attempting to engage legal
counsel, highlight the true state of labor relations and of the law in
modern China.
Unfortunately this is no longer a phenomenon that can be viewed
from a distance. China is now, and increasingly, an integral player in the
global economy and in international relations. The detention and
harassment of Yao Dan and Xiao Yu indicate what is at stake: economic
and political restructuring in China today is affecting the lives of millions,
yet only a small number of top bureaucrats and wealthy regime-backed
entrepreneurs are making the basic decisions about the outcome of this
3
4

Liaoyang Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 71.
Human Rights in China, supra note 2.
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process. This bureaucratic and entrepreneurial class resists fiercely any
serious attempt to build independent and democratic institutions such as
trade unions. If this means exposing the regime as hypocritical about its
commitment to the rule of law in China, they seem willing to take the
political heat.
The globalization process that has done so much to integrate the
Chinese economy into the world economy has only encouraged the
regime. Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, European and American
corporations are fighting tooth and nail to take advantage of the changes
underway in China. They see China as offering the world a vast pool of
relatively cheap labor that comes not a moment too soon as declining
profitability has hit returns to investors in the advanced economies.
According to official government statistics, China's urban population has
more than quadrupled since the early 1950s, whereas its rural population
has only increased from 503 to 866 million. s This massive population
shift is contributing to a significant unemployment problem. And that, in
turn, is the cause of widespread social unrest. The Chinese Communist
regime views this unrest as subversive of their entrenched power. Thus,
rather than being concerned that the violation of universally recognized
civil liberties such as the right of access to legal counsel and the freedom
of association is the source of increased tension with the outside world,
the regime views these violations as the solution to a significant problem
facing the global economy. The international labor movement has
struggled for more than a century to establish basic human rights,
including labor rights, as an inviolable floor beneath which the world
could not sink. Unless the labor movement and the world community as
a whole confronts China directly with an alternative path of economic
and political development, the integration of China into the global
economy puts that century-long achievement at great risk.
The emerging Chinese model-a "socialist market economy"
according to the regime itself-represents a new stage in the evolution of
post Cold War global capitalism. The core principle of this model is the
so-called "race to the bottom" where global multinational corporations
ally with repressive developing country governments to combine high
productivity manufacturing and services with cheap labor at the expense
of unionized workers in developed economies. Free market advocates
typically attempt to reduce the idea of a "race to the bottom" in global
labor conditions to a caricature. If there really were a race to the
bottom, they ask, then why are there so few multinationals operating in
central Africa or countries like Haiti, where wages are indeed the lowest
in the world? It is certainly true that capital is reluctant to invest in
5 1998 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (China Stat. Info. & Consultancy Service
Centre) at 105.
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countries like Haiti or Rwanda, though such countries have long been
the source of vital natural resources and agricultural products for global
multinationals. It is also true that an examination of cross-border trade
and investment flows demonstrates that the vast majority of such flows
are between developed economies, not between the developed and
developing world. 6
But that misstates the problem. The "race to the bottom" defines a
different and new issue: the ability of sophisticated multinational
corporate capital to combine high-productivity technology with labor
that is paid substantially less than that found in the developed world.
Developing this dynamic is not as simple as finding the worst-paid and
most-repressed workers in the world. What one. finds, in fact, in
countries like Haiti or Rwanda are not workers in the classic senseready and available to be part of the disciplined structure of a modern
capitalist firm. In large part the populations of those countries are at a
near-feudal level of development, with the "workforce" resembling
peasants, not modern workers. The difference in China or Mexico or
Indonesia is that decades of rule there by modernizing authoritarian
states has produced a new kind of workforce that is akin to that found in
Europe or the United States, but at a wage level far below that of the
advanced economies and without the independent political power that
characterizes countries with strong labor movements.
The "race to the bottom" is, in fact, what Harley Shaiken calls "high
productivity poverty.'" This "isn't the poverty of Haiti or Bangladesh,"
Shaiken argues, "where industry is antiquated and the societies and
people are poor.... The problem isn't developing countries attracting
advanced manufacturing, but rather that wages aren't simply low; they
are artificially depressed. The law or the club-or both-are used to
prevent workers from sharing the gains.... [T]he historic link between
workers producing more and earning more is tragically reversedworkers produce more and earn less."s Financial analyst Richard
Duncan confirms this trend:
Almost any labor-intensive product that can be made in the
United States, Western Europe or Japan can be made at
considerably less cost in China or a dozen other low-wage
nations. Impediments once thrown up by transportation
problems or capital shortages have long since been overcome
by technological developments and the removal of capital
6

See

PAUL HIRST

&

GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE

(1996).
Nancy Montwieier, 'High Productivity Poverty' Threatens Workers Labor,
Professor Warns Machinists Meeting, DAILY LAB. REp., Sep. 13,2000, at C-l.
8 [d. See also, HARLEY SHAIKEN, MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HIGH
TECHNOLOGY AND WORK ORGANIZATION IN EXPORT INDUSTRIES (1990).
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE
7
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controls. Today, the most capital-intensive manufacturing
processes can be financed and built in any number of
developing countries, so that the most advanced facilities can
be combined with the lowest-cost labor.9
This break in the link between productivity and wages is the key to
understanding the phenomenon known widely as the "race to the
bottom." The creation of that link was the result of decades of effort by
the international trade union movement. In the late 1920s and 1930s it
led economists to speak of a new development: wage rigidity. This was
the reflection in economic theory of the power of trade unions in a
business downturn. It led John Maynard Keynes to conclude that the
normal process of wages falling to a market-clearing price, often referred
to as "Say's Law" as Keynes understood it, no longer functioned.lO
But today China's entrance into the world economy represents the
attempted integration of nearly a billion new workers into the global
labor market at wages far below those found in the advanced economies.
This signals the return of a world that operates according to Say's Law
because the constraints on free markets, such as "wage rigidity" and the
union power reflected in an effective international labor rights regime,
may dissolve. As one leading Wall Street economist told his clients:
China's labor force is bigger than that in all of the OECD
countries combined. Its rapid development has caused
dramatic shifts in relative factor prices in a short period of
9 RICHARD DUNCAN, THE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CURES 144
(2003).
10 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 26 (1964). There is enormous controversy within the field of economic
history on the actual definition of Say's Law and on Keynes' interpretation of it. In
fact, the Law itself is better understood as the "law of markets"-which holds that
where there is no "interference" with the markets they will find an equilibrium
whereby all output can be sold. Only what W.H. Hutt called "defects in pricing" can
interfere with the exchange of all output for other goods and services. W.H. HUlT, A
REHABILITATION OF SAY'S LAW 8 (1974). But there is very little controversy about
what Keynes meant on a substantive level, that the power of the labor movement
constrained the ability of the private sector and the government to use wage cutting as
a means of jumpstarting economic growth in a depression. "To suppose that a flexible
wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of
laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. It is only in a highly authoritarian society,
where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed that a flexible wagepolicy could function with success. One can imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany
or Russia, but not in France, the United States or Great Britain." KEYNES at 269.
Recall, of course, that this was when fascism or Stalinism ruled the first set of states,
while democracy continued to function in the latter set. Hutt expressed the more
traditional laissez-faire view that the power of unions was a key "defect in pricing"
rather than the inevitable byproduct of modern capitalism. HUlT at 134-144. On Say
generally, see EVELYN L. FORGET, THE SOCIAL ECONOMICS OF JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY:
MARKETS AND VIRTUE (1999).
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time. Some of the changes will be permanent even with
China's maturity. The most important one is that the value of
labor will be permanently devalued against scarce resources.
This is likely to have far-reaching consequences to the
distribution of income in the world. The speed comes from
the fact that the labor productivity gap between China and
the mature economies is far less than the wealth gap between
them. . . . China's reintegration into the global economy,
therefore, presents a major discontinuity. The gaps between
China and developed economies for productivity and for
wealth are expressing themselves through rapid capital
reallocation from mature economies to China and the
consequent rapid growth of China's exports. The key driver
is China's low wages resulting from its vast surplus labor and
low level of wealth. l1
Far from being an anomaly, then, the arrest and conviction of
Chinese labor activists, the harassment of their families for attempting to
meet with legal counsel, and the violent suppression of democratic
institutions such as free trade unions and independent political parties,
represent a stark, if not dark, future for the global system. In fact, the
effort to move the world in this direction has been given significant
support by attempts to change the basic structure and purpose of central
international institutions such as the International Labor Organization
("ILO") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Such a
conclusion runs counter to the arguments made about the nature of
political and economic reform in China today. For the most part,
supporters of the Chinese restructuring process argue that the market
reforms underway there today will naturally create an opening for
political pluralism and, eventually, a genuine rule of law and
democratization. 12 This viewpoint is reflected inside the international
labor movement itself by those who argue that the trade union
movement should begin a process of "constructive engagement" with the
government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions
("ACFfU,,).13 The view held by some westerners that China will evolve
towards democracy simply because it undertakes market reforms and the
subset of this view held by some within the western labor movement that
China's state-controlled labor organization, the ACFTU, will begin to, or
11 Andy Xie, Asia Pacific: The Chinese Decade, MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL
ECON. F., Feb. 10, 2003.
12 Henry M. Paulson, Jr., More Than the Bloom of One I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 2000, at 17.
13 Kent Wong & Elaine Bernard, Labor's Mistaken Anti-China Campaign, NEW
LAB. F. (FalllWinter 2000) ("Labor needs to encourage critical engagement with
China .... [L]abor leaders should take a bold step and seek to open up dialogue and
cultivate relationships with workers and trade unions [sic] in China.").
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already does, behave like a genuine trade union and thus helps reinforce
the alleged evolution towards democracy, is viewed as naive by longtime
specialists in Chinese politics and labor issues. 14 Such views may, in fact,
reflect changing attitudes towards democracy and labor rights in the
West as much as they do a genuine assessment of the current situation in
China.
This article will take its lead from the actions of the Chinese regime
itself. The regime's fear that the mere presence of two young women in
Beijing trying to meet with a lawyer representing their labor activist
fathers suggests that there are two major issues of concern to the Chinese
regime: law and labor. Thus, at the level of law, the focus will be on the
changes that have taken place in the WTO and the ILO that are
reinforcing the emerging Chinese model. China entered the WTO after
a bitter political battle between the American trade union movement, on
the one hand, and nearly the entire U.S. political and business
establishment, on the other. But this could only be accomplished by the
codification of a certain new approach to international labor rights in
both the WTO and the ILO. This article will argue that this new
approach has actually created a legal pathology that only postpones
resolution of the real problems associated with the Chinese model. It is
an unstable compromise that conflicts with other principles at work in
the international legal environment. ls
These international legal developments are being met domestically
within China by an attempt to impose a new regime on the Chinese
working class. This new regime relies on the same heavy-handed
authoritarian measures that have long been constituent elements of
modern Chinese politics. In the past the Chinese Communists justified
such measures by the alleged need to resist the encroachment of
capitalism, while now the Party defends the same authoritarian approach
14 Minxin Pei, Don't hold your breath for openness in China, FIN. TIMES, May 7,
2003 at 15 (discussing "sclerotic authoritarian regime syndrome" that afflicts Chinese
leaders); ACFTU-ICFTU: A Modern Love Story in the Making?, 52 CHINA LAB.
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 2000, available at http://www.china-Iabour.org.hk (last visited Aug. 4,
2003; on file with author) (noting that "aspirations of the international trade union
movement and the international work of the ACFTU stand contrary to each other").
15 E.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. III,
art. 8(1)(a), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) recognizes the right of individuals "to form trade unions and join the trade
union of his choice ... [and] the right to strike" [hereinafter ICESCR]. See Aaron N.
Lehl, China's Trade Union System Under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Is China in Compliance with Article 8?, 21 U. HAW. L.
REV. 203, 226 (1999). The ICESCR is, in some ways, stronger than the ILO
Declaration as it not only incorporates the crucial principle of freedom of choice of
labor organizations but also recognizes the right to strike.
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as necessary to succeed in the capitalist world. These developments feed
each other. As accommodations are made to undemocratic approaches
to human rights in international institutions, those elements in countries
like China that see a shortcut to wealth and power through
authoritarianism are encouraged to continue to suppress democratic
movements. In addition, there is an unhealthy feedback into the
advanced economies as the "race to the bottom" undermines the ability
of those economies to provide better wages, hours and working
conditions in industries that compete with Chinese authoritarianism.
Thus, the international labor movement may have the most to lose
among an array of democratic institutions. Even commentators reluctant
to embrace the idea of a "race to the bottom" in the global market pause
when they consider the overwhelming impact of China. 16 An example
from just one industrial sector-textile, clothing and footwearillustrates the problem. While throughout the 1990s the number of
people working in this industry remained stable at 30 million, Cynthia
Williams has noted, "there has been a dramatic shift in the distribution of
those jobs towards Asia," with that region now accounting for 72 percent
of world employment in the sector and China alone 20 percent.
Meanwhile, employment in Europe and the United States in that sector
"fell steadily throughout 1990-1998." Williams refers to an ILO study
that notes that the average hourly wage rate in the industry ranges from
a high of $10 an hour in Europe to a low of $0.45 an hour in China.17
But if labor loses so does democracy. The trade union is a central
force for democratization, transparency and social responsibility in a
modern industrial economy. Without the ability to form effective trade
unions, workers cannot be said to enjoy fundamental human rights such
as the freedom of association or the freedom of speech or the right to
have grievances heard and redressed. Without an effective labor
movement there is no counterweight to the power of business interests or
volatile market forces in society or to the state itself. The power of the
market to force new forms of brutal competition can easily take hold,
generating deep political conflict and social unrest. Equally possible is
the emergence of a Leviathan state that suppresses human freedom. In
16 William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
International Labor Standards, SO NEB. L. REV. 715 (2001) ("there is no evidence of a
'race to the bottom' internationally in the labor arena" but "there are substantial
arguments for international regulation" because "the outlier countries coupled with
China make it possible that the 'race to the bottom' phenomenon could yet become a
pressing one").
17 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 V.c. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 731 (2002), citing Press Release, ILO,
Global Employment Levels in Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industries Holding
Stable as Industries Relocate (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://www.ilo.orglpublic/
englishlbureau/inflprI2000/3S.htm.
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fact, as this article should demonstrate, this is precisely why exploring the
process of economic reform in China is so important. The economic
changes underway there are creating huge new inequities and
imbalances. This is now leaking into the international arena as China's
cheap labor export-led model of growth has generated a massive trade
imbalance between China and the United States. As the presidential
elections approach this is becoming an increasingly important problem in
domestic U.S. politics. Thus, this article will argue, there is a need to
articulate an alternative model that restores the role of democratic
institutions as a counterweight to Say's "law of markets."
To explore these issues, this article will consider four areas of
concern. First, the structural changes underway in the Chinese economy
are creating both domestic and international imbalances that exacerbate
inequalities among Chinese workers and create new inequities in the
global labor market. Second, the Chinese regime's approach to labor
rights remains rigidly authoritarian and, as a result, it is triggering ever
more dramatic confrontations between workers and the Chinese state,
despite the regime's nominal commitment to "socialism." Third, these
developments are being reinforced by a pathological evolution in the
principles that govern key international institutions such as the WTO and
the ILO. A conflict has emerged within the international legal arena
between the founding principles of these institutions and their current
approach to labor and human rights issues. Fourth, within the
international labor movement itself a small current is emerging which
views an accommodation with the Chinese regime as a feasible
alternative to the long-standing support of the international labor
movement for independent and free trade unionism in China. This
approach threatens the credibility of the labor movement's opposition to
the most damaging aspects of the globalization process, a major
commitment of organized labor at least since the "Battle of Seattle" that
took place at the failed ministerial conference of the WTO in November
1999. 18
These four developments militate in favor of the need to reassert
core principles of labor solidarity but these must not just be mindlessly
repeated. These developments signal a new form of global capitalism
that increasingly sees authoritarianism as having a natural role in a
modern economy. The unquestioned acceptance of the outcomes of the
"law of markets," no matter how volatile, uneven, or unjust, now appears
to be the norm as social movements and democratic institutions are
rendered a nearly mute Greek chorus. Thus critics must take into
18 See Stephen F. Diamond, Bridging the Divide: An Alternative Approach to
International Labor Rights After the Battle of Seattle, 29 PEpP. L. REV. 115, 117 (2001
[hereinafter Bridging the Divide].
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account the new forms of capitalism and the power of its norms as it
devises alternatives. Restoring the validity of questioning outcomes and
thus of the value of social input and control of those outcomes must lie at
the heart of these alternatives. This means that support, for example, for
labor rights in China must go beyond the typical anti-Stalinist rhetoric
that labor has used in the past. While the Chinese regime may fear the
emergence of a Polish Solidarity-style movement, the labor movement
must also learn from the mistakes and limits of the Solidarity experience.
II.

CHINA'S ECONOMY AT A TURNING POINT

It is hard to overstate the magnitude of the changes underway in
China today. While still only accounting for 5 percent of global
manufactured exports in 2002, according to Morgan Stanley chief
economist Stephen Roach, China nonetheless accounted for 29 percent
of that year's growth in that sector. 19 This remarkable development is the
result of twenty years of economic policy change in China. In the early
Eighties, the regime partially freed up prices in the agricultural sector
and allowed farmers to retain a portion of their profits. This, in turn,
unleashed pent-up demand for consumer goods, and so the regime went
one step further, endorsing the new light industry and consumer goods
businesses that began to emerge in the rural townships and villages.
What one observer called an "extraordinarily virtuous economic circle"
emerged whereby higher prices for food stimulated demand for basic
consumer products like bicycles, televisions, and refrigerators and,
increasingly, for light industrial goods such as tractors. 20 This process
sustained growth rates averaging 9 percent for most of the 1980s.21 Nonfarm employment tripled from thirty million to ninety-three million
people in that decade alone, with some sixteen million new rural
businesses established. 22
These new entities are seen by western Sinophiles as evidence of the
emergence of a new private entrepreneurial class in China allowing the
country, in the words of mainstream economist Barry Naughton, to
"grow out of the Plan.»23 But many of these new firms were formed with
19 Stephen Roach, Global: China - Externally or Internally Driven?, MORGAN
STANLEY GLOBAL ECON. F., April 2, 2003.
20 JOE STUDWELL, THE CHINA DREAM: THE QUEST FOR THE LAST GREAT
UNTAPPED MARKET ON EARTH 34 (2002).
21 Id. at 38.
22 Id. at 34.
23 BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM 1978-1993 (1995); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, The Central
Role of Entrepreneurs in Economic Reform (2002) (unpublished paper, on file with
author); John McMillan, China's Nonconformist Reforms (1994) (unpublished paper,
on file with author).
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local state and party official endorsement and participation. They have
become a new competing power center in Chinese society, absorbing
scarce financial resources. They are also the source of huge new income
inequalities. Although the country has indeed registered huge gains in
national income during the last twenty years, the gains have not been
equally reflected in the personal income of ordinary Chinese households.
In an articulate and thorough study entitled Inequality and Poverty in
China, economists Azizur Khan and Carl Riskin take careful aim at the
impact of market reforms and find the results disturbing. 24 Communist
Party reformer Deng Xiaoping had declared "let some get rich first" and
the lucky few have done so with a vengeance. Khan and Riskin note that
"between 1988 and 1995 inequality in the distribution of income in China
increased sharply [as] China [became] one of the more unequal of the
Asian developing countries." Thus, despite the impressive macro-level
gains of the 1980s, as the 1990s unfolded there was, this study concluded,
"an unusually rapid widening of income inequality ... a much retarded
rate of poverty reduction in the countryside ... and a significant increase
in absolute poverty in the towns and cities." In rural China, the
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have actually worsened
income inequality as the enterprises offer higher wages but to only a
small portion of the newly available workforce of former peasants, who
are mostly forced to survive at or below the poverty line on whatever
their backyard plots of land can produce.
Nonetheless, despite its apparent growth, the new so-called private
sector does not have anywhere near the resources to meet the huge
industrial needs of Chinese society. The single largest fully private entity
in China has annual revenues of $600 million, half the turnover of the
1000th company on the Fortune 1000 list. 25 Even today the private sector
contributes only one-eighth of the nation's gross domestic product and
employs less than twenty million workers in a nation of 1.2 billion
people. In any case, the apparent economic miracle began to slow
precipitously after the initial boost in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, it was
discovered that the TVEs "had overstated production by more than 40
percent[,]" wiping out $100 billion from the country's national income
accounts. 26 Much of the actual gain in GNP has been created by the
regime's continued reliance on heavy capital investment, thus only
exacerbating inequality and poverty. Khan and Riskin identify what is
called "investment hunger," especially among local governments that are
now less constrained by Beijing as the early stages of the reform process
24

See generally
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POVERTY IN CHINA IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2001).
25 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 229; The 2003 Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr.

2003, available at http://www.fortune.com
26 [d. at 231-32.
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loosened the grip of national power.27 "The state allowed an expansion
of credit to pump up accumulation and drive a wedge between growth of
GDP and that of personal income.,,28
Despite the pace of reform, China's state-owned enterprises, or
SOEs, still control the "commanding heights" of the economy in
industries like steel, oil, and automobile assembly. In contrast to the
still-tiny private sector, China's two state-owned oil companies together
have revenues of more than $80 billion and are comfortably placed on
Fortune magazine's Asia's Top 50 lise9 In the state sector, one finds that
instead of the massive privatization that took place in the former Soviet
Union with such disastrous effect, the regime has tried only partial
privatizations, while continuing to feed these enterprises massive
amounts of credit, recycling the savings of China's billion people into
outdated and poor-performing industrial behemoths. China, in fact,
actually seems committed more than ever to state control of key
economic sectors. 30
Many of these enterprises are truly out of a different age-the age
of Soviet-influenced heavy industry or the American variant, the massive
auto complex at Ford's River Rouge. These plants were, like their
Soviet, American or Eastern European counterparts, impressive
achievements-fifty years ago. But in the context of industry today, they
are bankrupt. The regime thus finds itself in a trap of its own making.
Having created this heavy industrial base, it has also created a massive
industrial working class-or rather its new post-revolution working class
created this massive industrial base, through the use of the most brutal
forms of forced labor in the 1950s and 1960s.31 But to restructure now in
a fashion that would allow these companies to be globally competitive
would require huge layoffs and huge new capital investment. In the
spring of 2000, for example, the regime restructured its large state oil
industry and attempted an initial public offering ("IPO") of shares in the
newly formed Petro China to global investors, including a listing on the
New York Stock Exchange. To make the PetroChina IPO even barely
credible to global capital markets required the layoff of hundreds of
thousands and a promise to push billions in debt back to the state
27 KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 105.
28 Id. at 151.
29 Asia's Top 50, FORTUNE, Jul. 21,2003, available at http://www.fortune.com (last
visited Dec. 4, 2003).
30 Barry Naughton, Opening the Red Box: Explaining Economic Policy Regimes
in China, Walter Shorenstein Forum, AsialPacific Research Center, Stanford
University, Feb. 6, 2003.
31 See NIGEL HARRIS, THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN: MARX AND MAO IN MODERN
CHINA (1978).
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through PetroChina's parent company, China National Petroleum
(CNPC), which remained entirely in state hands.32
The only way that the regime believes it can preserve its own power
in this process is to "muddle through," in Joe Studwell's words. 33 Thus,
the regime allows foreign companies to set up assembly plants in the
special economic zones in coastal areas and, in the niches not already
occupied by the state sector, encourages a limited domestic private sector
to evolve from below. But it cannot allow the resulting inequalities and
poverty this process causes to become so extreme that workers revolt.
The regime fears a social explosion, called by the Chinese da luan or total
chaos, a fear made real by the labor insurgency that took place in the
spring of 2002 in the oilfields run by PetroChina and in the industrial
zone of Liaoyang. 34 The pall of Hungary in 1956 and Poland in 1980
continue to hang over the Chinese Communists.
Meanwhile, the regime continues feeding enough credit to the SOEs
to keep them alive; conditioning the credit on hoped-for restructuring,
but not so much credit that inflation is unleashed. Inflation has been a
continuing problem, causing the regime to punctuate the growth of the
last two decades with binges of harsh austerity. What many in the West
view as a struggle between hard and soft-liners, or between a "Maoist"
left and a "market socialist" right, is really a reflection of managing a
business cycle with "Chinese characteristics." This is a risky business for
the regime. The price controls of the late 1980s certainly tamed an
inflation rate that reached 50 percent in 1988, but that austerity was
considered a key factor in triggering the 1989 social revolt centered in
Beijing's Tiananmen Square.35 The protests received widespread popular
support with marches of a million workers or more in several major
cities. The regime could only kill the movement by relying on the brutal
efficiency of crack troops from the People's Liberation Army. After that
event controlling wages was much less of a problem for several years.36
Thus, "muddling through" may not be sufficient. The credit that
sustains the growth process must come from somewhere. The free trade
zones on the Chinese coast are fed by foreign direct investment. But the
32 Stephen F. Diamond, The Petro China Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in
the Anti-Globalization Era, 29 J. CORP. L. 101 (2003).
33 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 215.
34 50,000 Daqing Oilfield Workers Organise Independent Trade Union, CHINA
LAB. BULL., Mar. 6, 2002; Mass Paramilitary Deployment Quells Daqing
Demonstrations, CHINA LAB. BULL., Mar. 26, 2002.
35 KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 107.
36 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that a "particularly perverse ... effect
of the aftermath of the Tienanmen killings was that the government was able to see
through its austerity programme ... without a murmur of dissent. The population was
too terrified to object .... Urban wages were held down and the urban unemployment
rate reached its highest level since the start of the decade. ").
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SOEs and the domestic private sector rely on the recycling of the huge
savings of ordinary Chinese people. Since the banking system is stateowned and, in theory, the renminbi is not convertible into foreign
currencies, Chinese workers, peasants and small businesses are forced to
finance the continued capital accumulation drive of the Communist
regime. The whole game depends on the regime's continuing top-down
control of that financial system. Thus, promises of convertibility of the
currency as early as 1993 are now put off well into the future. 31
Of course, if the renminbi were freely tradable on the world markets
and if ordinary Chinese savers could freely hold their savings in foreign
banks or invest them in the equities of European or American companies
as their counterparts do in the West and much of Asia, there would most
likely be a massive "run on the bank" as the value of Chinese assets
would be forced to come into line with global values. The pressure on
domestic values is so great that Stud well argues that even without
convertibility or an opening of the financial sector a bank run is still a
possibility: "[e]verything comes down to psychology... the psychology of
the ordinary Chinese people," he notes. 38 From this vantage point, events
like the 1989 Tiananmen revolt take on new meaning. China may be in
the grips of an investment bubble that, once it bursts, will cause a social
and economic crisis that dwarfs that which afflicted most of Asia in the
late 1990s. In the case of China, the "hot money" that sparked the Asian
financial crisis is actually represented by the domestic savings of ordinary
Chinese, fueled by the bulging domestic reserves linked to Chinese
exports. A "flood of credit [in the 1990s] allowed an over-investment
binge that caused the ratio of private investment to personal
consumption to peak at 83 percent in 1993 and to remain above 70
percent thereafter.,,39 The regime's credibility, and therefore its power,
depends on maintaining the credibility of its economic policy. It is not
just that the regime fears a Solidarity-like protest movement rising up in
reaction to political repression or unemployment; it also fears a tearing
away of the veil that covers up the country's financial fragility. This
could, in turn, cause the population to lose their faith in the regime and,
in turn, trigger a massive political upheaval.
What are the escape routes for the regime? A massive debt-forequity swap is one. Since the debts the state has accumulated using
domestic savings must eventually be repaid and in the meantime the
state must pay interest, the debts can get very expensive. The stateowned banks now hold massive amounts in non-performing loans made
to the SOEs and the TVEs. On top of that, the government has huge
37

STUD WELL,

38

[d. at 214.

39

DUNCAN,

supra note 20, at 211-212.

supra note 9, at 159.
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under-funded pension liabilities. When these massive liabilities are
added together, Studwell estimates a debt-to-equity ratio of nearly 500
percent for the state sector-outstripping even South Korea on the verge
of its economic collapse in 1997. 40 So by creating stock markets, the
regime has tried to encourage Chinese savers to invest instead in equity
issued by these same state companies. The regime even dreams of large
mutual funds rescuing them from the pension trap they face, hoping they
can convince Chinese workers to trade the "iron" rice bowl guarantees of
an earlier era for the volatile world of publicly-traded equities. But
equity holders expect capital gains over time and hope that inside
managers will payout regular dividends, and neither is legally mandated.
And in China, senior corporate insiders, for the most part still members
of the ruling Communist Party, have the additional advantage that they
need not fear the disciplinary effect of a potential takeover by
competitors or financial players since there is, as of yet, no competitive
market for corporate control in China. 4 ! This shift to equity finance
explains the stock market mania that hit China in the 1990s. The regime
engaged, it appears, in a massive "pump and dump" scheme touting
share ownership in companies that by any stretch of the imagination
were actually worthless. In the first half of 1992 the Shanghai stock
market index registered an unsustainable gain of 1200 percent. 42
A second strategy has been to turn to foreign stock markets, first in
Hong Kong, but more recently to the London and New York Stock
Exchanges. There Chinese companies have been notably less successful.
The pump-and-dump has not fooled quite as many investors. Where
Chinese companies trade their stock both at home and on the Hong
Kong exchange, the shares sold in Hong Kong trade at a substantial
discount, as much as 85 percent, giving the outside world some idea of
the discount factor that one might have to apply to the entire Chinese
economy if its assets were freely tradable. 43 Finally, the regime has
encouraged the establishment of foreign investment in the so-called
Special Economic Zones. But even the explosive growth of the Zones
makes a relatively small dent in this massive country. More importantly,
their potential future growth is limited. Most of these plants are only
final assembly points in a global assembly line so that the value added by
Chinese workers is a small percentage of top-line revenue. The sector
shipped $150 billion worth of goods in 2000, but less than 25 percent of
that was value added in the free trade areas in China. 44 The state sector
cannot compete yet in quality and reliability with the foreign suppliers
40
41
42

43
44

STUD WELL, supra note 20, at 206.
Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome, supra note 32, at 127.
ld. at 65.
ld. at 213.
[d. at 226.
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that feed parts into the assembly plants. In addition, the companies are
heavily dependent on the infrastructure provided by coastal proximity to
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly, as Khan and Riskin note, despite
what free trade theory might predict, the industrialization in this and the
TVE sectors "so far. . . has been quite employment-hostile" with
increases in employment declining "drastically" even as output spurted
ahead. 4s
The social and political effects of this process are equally striking.
As a result of this reform process there are estimates that as many as 20
million people a year are leaving the rural areas of China for the cities in
search of work. 46 To put this in perspective, a single year's inflow of new
urban workers in China is equivalent to the entire manufacturing
employment base of the United States. In fact, because of the recent
downturn in the U.S. economy some 2 million jobs have been lost and
manufacturing employment in the U.S. has now dropped to a twentyyear low of 16 million jobs. This has now made the U.S.-China trade
balance a politically sensitive issue inside the United States.47 China's
trade surplus with the United States is now the world's largest, reaching
$83 billion in 2001, while the balance with Mexico was in surplus only to
the tune of $30 billion. 48 Even Japan, America's most feared competitor
in the 1980s, had a surplus of only $69 billion that year.49 This has led to
pressure by the U.S. government on China to revalue its currency,
currently pegged to the dollar at a rate of roughly 8 to 1, thus making
U.S. exports relatively more expensive. 50 Meanwhile, as discussed below,
domestically China is experiencing an unprecedented wave of worker
unrest. Thus, the reform process is creating internal and external
imbalances that are increasingly the stimulus for domestic social conflict
and global tension.

KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 152-53.
Karby Leggett, The Outlook: Under Pressure, China Blesses Private Sector,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2000, at Al ("20 million new job seekers enter the labor market
every year); Andy Xie, China: The Virtuous Cycle Continues, MORGAN STANLEY
GLOBAL ECON. F., Mar. 6, 2001 ("China's biggest challenge is to create 20 million jobs
a year to absorb the entire labor surplus over two decades").
47 Neil King, Trade With China is Heating Up As a Business and Political Issue,
WALL ST. J., Jui. 30, 2003, at AI; David Barboza, Textile Industry Seeks Trade Limits
on Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Jui. 25, 2003, at Cl; Karby Leggett & Peter Wonacott, Surge
in Exports From China Gives a lolt to Global Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10,2002, at
AI.
48 DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 201.
49 Id.
50 Chen Zhao, The Fed is in a dangerous game with China, FIN. TIMES (London,
England), Jui. 30, 2003, at 11; David DeRosa, Everybody Is Prodding China to
Revalue the Yuan, BLOOMBERG, Jui. 11, 2003.
45
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CHINESE TRADE UNIONISM

A central feature of China's approach to economic policy is to
maintain tight control over its workforce even as it opens up the
economy. Thus the country's policy towards trade unionism is crucial to
understanding the relationship of China to the world economy today. As
is widely accepted in political theory and history, trade unions provide a
counterweight to the power of government and business interests in a
modern industrial society. The aggressive spread of neo-liberal policies
through globalization has undermined the ability of unions to play this
role in the post-Cold War world. But the need for trade unions has only
increased. The political impact of trade unions is widely recognized. The
effort to organize a union requires certain political liberties, such as free
speech, the right of assembly and the right to have grievances redressed.
These broader political liberties run parallel to core labor standards like
the right to join the union of one's own choice and the rights to organize,
to bargain, and, if necessary, to strike. A country with a strong union
movement is also likely, therefore, to be a country with a vibrant
democracy and respect for the rule of law.
These rights are still largely absent in China and this is reflected in
the status of the labor movement there. The ACFTU is simply a creature
of the Chinese state and the Communist Party. It is obligated by its own
rules and law to act as a transmission belt for party and state policy. As
labor unrest has spread across China in the last few years, the ACFTU
has sat on the sidelines, emerging on occasion only to condemn these
rank-and-file efforts to secure jobs, pensions and other basic economic
benefits. In the wake of the mass protests in the spring of 2002 by
workers in the metal industry of Liaoyang that led to the imprisonment
of Xiao Yunliang and Yao Fuxin,51 the ACFTU publicly condemned the
two worker leaders at the annual conference of the ILO in Geneva for
"illegally demonstrating" and charging them with having "burned cars
and destroying public property" although the latter charge was never
brought forward in court. 52 Later, in a reply to the ILO's own
investigation of the Liaoyang events, the Chinese government accused
the leaders of "terrorism and sabotage, ,,53 though these charges also were
never brought against the activists in the eventual court case discussed
above. 54 During the same time period workers in the oil industry in
Daqing in northern China organized demonstrations against cuts in
severance benefits. Their actions were condemned as "unacceptable and
51
52
53
54

See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
Liaoyang Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 11.
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See Criminal Verdict, supra note 1, at 71.
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illegal" by the ACFTU. 55 This is a pattern that is all too familiar to
students of societies in transition from Stalinism to modern capitalism.
There is little hope that China will avoid this pattern. And thus the
international labor movement has generally given its support to efforts to
form genuine, independent unions in China as part of the support for the
development of the rule of law and respect for human rights. 56
Independent trade unions are outlawed in China. 57 The ACFTU
maintains what the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
("ICFTU"), the leading global labor umbrella organization, calls a "trade
union monopoly."58 The right to strike does not exist. 59 An effort to
establish a Workers Autonomous Federation (WAF) as part of the wider
Democracy Movement of 1989 was met with particularly harsh
repression. Many affiliates of that Federation are still in prison or labor
camps. Amnesty International details numerous ongoing abuses of
workers for their organizing and other activity.60 Arrests and arbitrary
detentions were made throughout 1999 as labor unrest increased due to
the worsening economic situation. Here are some of the examples they
report:
Li Qingxi, a laid-off worker from the Datong coalmine in
Shanxi province, was arrested in January when he posted
publicly a statement calling for independent trade unions. He
was sentenced in March without charge or trial to one year of
"re-education through labor," reportedly to be served "at
home." Zhang Shanuang, a labor rights activist from Hunan
province, was detained in July after trying to set up a group to
help laid-off workers. He was sentenced in December to 10
years' imprisonment, accused of having "illegally provided
information to overseas hostile organizations and
individuals," reportedly for speaking about farmers' protests
in his province in a Radio Free Asia interview. 61
The widely respected China Labour Bulletin, based in Hong Kong,
confirms that the process of "economic restructuring has led to huge
pressures on the Chinese labour market... many workers laid off from
55 Press Release, CHINA LAB. BULL., Mar. 6, 2002 (on file with author).
56 INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS EXECUTIVE BD., ICFTU
CHINA POLICY (November 27-29, 2002) (on file with author) ("noting that the
ACFTU is not an independent trade union organization and, therefore, cannot be
regarded as an authentic voice of Chinese workers").
57 INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS (2003) [hereinafter ICFTU SURVEY]'

Id.
See discussion infra at notes 84-92.
60 AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 1999 (1999). AMNESTY INT'L, People's Republic of
China: Labour unrest and the right to freedom of association and expression: "Workers
want to eat - Workers want a job," AI INDEX: ASA 17/015/2002 (Apr. 2002).
61 AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 1999 (1999).
58

59
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SOEs have expressed dissatisfaction with the long working hours, shortterm contracts and miserly benefits that more than not await them in the
private sector."62 Linked to this dissatisfaction is a rise in labor disputes,
despite the frightening risk that such voicing of grievances to official
bodies entails. Even the state-controlled Labor Disputes and Arbitration
Committees reported a 58 percent increase in cases heard in the first six
months of 1999. Of course, the vast majority of such disputes are
reported only as "solved" with few details available on the facts. There
are serious procedural obstacles to bringing such disputes to the dispute
resolution bodies, so it is unknown how many on the job grievances go
unreported. 63 In fact, the worst fears of critics of the PetroChina IPO and
restructuring process came true in the spring of 2002 when massive
demonstrations by laid-off workers took place in the Daqing oilfields
owned by CNPC and PetroChina. 64 These were soon followed by large
protests by unemployed workers in several parts of China, including an
unusual demonstration by workers in Beijing itself. Arrests of protest
leaders such as the fathers of Yao Dan and Xiao Yu were paired with
modest economic concessions by the regime thus ending this particular
wave of unrest. 65 However, one sociologist calls these demonstrations
evidence of a "labor insurgency" underway in China. 66
All of China's industrial workers are members of the only "trade
union" body allowed to exist-the ACFfU. The ACFfU is a constituent
body of the Chinese State and thus is controlled by Communist Party
cadre. As in the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European
satellites, this is a "trade union" in name only. It is, in fact, in the
Chinese regime's own words, "a mass organization of the working class"
and it serves as a transmission belt for the party and state leadership.
The Communist Party appoints all of its officials. As the ACFfU itself
stated in 1990: "the administration of union cadres by the Party is an
unchangeable principle. The ACFfU should work together with the
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party in laying down regulations concerning cadre
management and in monitoring the nomination, investigation, election,
approval and allocation of union leaders." The same document goes on
to state that:
62
63

Feature: Unemployment, 50 CHINA LAB. BULL. (Sept.-Oct. 1999).
See Workers' Forum: The Struggle Continues, 51 CHINA LAB. BULL. (Nov.-Dec.

1999).

Radio Broadcast Transcript, Daqing Oilfield Workers' Struggle, CHINA LAB.
BULL., Mar. 6, 2002.
65 Press Release, Amnesty Int'!, "Subversion" Charges Must Not Be Used to
Imprison Rights Activists (Jan. 14, 2003).
66 Ching Kwan Lee, From the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of the Law: Labor
Insurgency in China, 31 THEORY & SOC'y 189 (2002) [hereinafter Specter of Mao].
64
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trade unions must resolutely oppose any organization or
individual expressing political views countering those of the
Party. . . On discovering the formation of workers'
organizations which oppose the Four Cardinal Principles67
and endanger the national regime, the trade union must
immediately report to same-level party committees and
senior-level unions, and must resolutely expose and dissolve
them. When necessary, the union should demand the
dissolution of such organizations by the government in
accordance with the law. Concerning organizations initiated
by workers out of their specific economic interests, the union
should advise them to dissolve and terminate their activities
through persuasion and counseling.68
Thus, the ACFfU serves as the "eyes and ears" of the state inside every
workplace. Far from supporting democratic and free trade unionism, the
ACFfU's central purpose is to carry out State and Party directives and
to do everything it can to insure that all workers fall into line as well.
It is no surprise to find out, therefore, that the ACFfU is viewed by
the state as a vehicle for encouraging worker support for the very
economic reform process that is devastating the social conditions of tens
of millions of workers. Dan Gallin, then General Secretary of the
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering,
Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations ("IUF"), noted after a mission
to Hong Kong in December, 1997, that earlier that month at a meeting of
the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
Hu Jintao (then a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party and
now President of China) urged trade union leaders to "arouse workers'
enthusiasm about reforms in [the state-owned enterprises], especially
about turning losses into profits and to complete the tasks set forth
during the recent 15th party congress." Hu Jintao added that trade
unions should "encourage workers to contribute to the development of
new products and technological improvements," that they should provide
more job opportunities and professional training for laid-off workers,
and encourage them to change their old ideas and find new jobs
themselves.,,69 Those who do not conform to the new economic order are
subject to ACFfU "mobilizations." The Chinese political police (Public
67 The Four Cardinal Principles include: 1) To keep to the socialist road; 2) To
uphold the people's democratic dictatorship; 3) To uphold the leadership by the
Communist Party; and 4) To uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (CPC) amended and
adopted at the 16th CPC National Congress on Nov. 14, 2002 (on file with author).
68 INT'L UNION OF FOODWORKERS, REP. OF THE INT'L UNION OF FOODWORKERS
ON MISSION TO CHINA 18 (1997), available at http://www.global-labouLorgichina.htm
[hereinafter IUF MISSION TO CHINA).
69 [d. at 4.

HeinOnline -- 10 U. C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 58 2003-2004

The "Race to the Bottom" Returns

2003]

59

Security Bureau or "PSB") have issued "guidelines" that state that "the
union[s] must ... co-ordinate with the PSB, organize 'public order and
prevention teams' to protect the internal security and order of the
enterprises, as well as social order. Staff and workers should be
mobilized to struggle against all forms of criminal and illegal behavior.
The union must also assist the relevant authorities to deal adequately
with the education and employment of dismissed employees, workers
who have committed errors and those have completed sentences and
been released."70 This kind of directive can only be characterized as
chilling.
Far from encouraging progressive change, as China has integrated
itself into the world economy, its approach to trade unions has remained
rigidly closed. A 2001 revision to the Trade Union Law, last revised in
1992, only confirmed this. A new version of Article 4 of the Law, for
example, confirms the obligation of the ACFfU to: " ... take economic
construction as the centre, adhere to the socialist road, uphold the
people's democratic dictatorship, abide by the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party, adhere to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought
and Deng Xiaoping Theory.,,71 The Law also mandates that the ACFfU
role in the face of a strike is to " ... assist the enterprise or institution in
making proper preparations for resuming work and restoring work order
as soon as possible.'>72 The China Labour Bulletin concludes that such
prOVisIOns:
reaffirm... the ACFTU's subordinate relationship to both
the government and the party at three levels: the union must
abide by the Party's guiding principles; the union must
subordinate its organization to the Party machinery; and the
union must perform the function of carrying out the wishes of
the Party in its intervention in labour disputes at local or
enterprise level. 73
In addition to the dramatic human rights picture and the suppression
of basic trade union freedoms, the general situation of workers presents
additional problems. Unemployment and forced migration have already
been mentioned. Other problems include the widespread use of
underemployment, short-term work, and contract labor, the continued
control of labor mobility by the state and massive violations of basic
health and safety precautions. Official statistics report nearly seven
million unemployed urban workers, but the China Labour Bulletin
70

71

[d.
Cited in Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, CHINA

LAB.

BULL., Feb. 28,

2002.
72
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[d.
[d.
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estimates that the total is closer to 21 million. 74 And even official
statistics admit to 30 million "more than needed" workers in the urban
areas. These are now supplemented by some 80 to 100 million "floating
people" who have left their villages looking for work in other areas of
the country.75
Despite the need for a massive shift in employment to new entities,
the state fears that uncontrolled mobility could open the door to
organized opposition to the regime. Thus, it has largely kept in place a
decades-old system of labor registration-the hukou system. 76 Under
hukou every Chinese citizen is required to "have a registration with the
hukou authority or hukou police at birth." In theory no Chinese may
work or live outside of the area where they were registered at birth. To
accommodate some economic pressures, the regime has instituted a
system for providing workers with temporary residence permits.
Punishment of both employers and employees is meted out if workers
are hired without a permit. n
Nonetheless, in the face of the officially-backed repression of
genuine trade unionism, workers have consistently attempted to organize
independent movements throughout the history of post-1949 Communist
China.78 Far from passively accepting the ideological claim of the regime
to be a "workers' state," Chinese workers have defied the mythology of
the regime in successive waves of unrest. Interestingly, in the first few
years of Communist rule the newly-established ACFTU was independent
and militant-somewhat like the trade unions in the first few years of
Castro's rule. But as in Cuba the state soon stepped in and deposed the
independent ACFTU leaders, turning the organization into a party-run
transmission belt organization after the classic Stalinist model. Worker
restiveness did not take long to reemerge, however, with a strike wave in
1956-57 that was apparently directly influenced by the Hungarian
uprising of that same year. Repression followed but so did periodic
74 The official figures can be found in Fei-Ling Wang, Labor Issues and Foreign
Direct Investment in the PRC, in ADVANCES IN CHINESE INDUSTRIAL STUDIES - THE
MANAGERIAL PROCESS AND IMPACf OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA
177 (c. Jayachandran et al. eds., 1999). The China Labour Bulletin estimates are
described in their study Feature: Unemployment, supra note 62.
75 See Fei-Ling Wang, [d. at 40.
76 See id. at 178.
77 On the hukou system and the contemporary Chinese labor market, see Fei-Ling
Wang, Floaters, moonlighters, and the underemployed: A national labor market with
Chinese characteristics, 7 J. CONTEMPORARY CHINA 459 (1998); see also Section 301
Petition, AFL-CIO, Mar. 16, 2004, available at http://www.aficio.org/issuespolitics/
globaleconomy/upload/china_petition.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
78 The following summary of independent worker activity is based on Worker
Passivity in China: A Maoist Myth, CHINA LAB. BULL., Nov. 2003 available at http://
iso.china-Iabour.org.hk/isol [hereinafter Worker Passivity].
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worker unrest, particularly during the Cultural Revolution and in the
wake of the death of Chou En Lai in the 1970s. In each case, the state
cracked down. In the early 1980s the Democracy Wall movement
emerged and included specific references to Poland's Solidarity.
Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee notes that "[t]he ascendance of the Polish
Solidarity Movement emboldened Chinese workers ... to take action."79
As economic reform under Deng gathered steam, worker unrest
resurfaced. The spring 1989 movement led to the most important period
of independent worker organizing in recent years. The activists of the
newly established Beijing WAF, which sparked numerous WAFs all over
the country, initially met with some hostility from the student
demonstrators, who restricted the workers' presence in Tiananmen to a
corner of the square.so The China Labour Bulletin describes what
happened:
As the numbers of students directly participating in the
Democracy Movement slowly began to dwindle, the WAFs
became stronger. Links between WAFs all over China were
being forged and some activists traveled to Beijing for
discussions. Correspondingly the position of the ACFTU
hardened towards the WAFs and on June 2, 1989 the official
Workers Daily called for the banning of the WAFs as illegal
organisations. The call was perhaps premature. Two days
later government troops fought their way into the Square and
made straight for the BWAF tents. In the repression that
followed, thousands of workers suspected of taking part in
WAF organisations were rounded up and shot or sent to
prison. sl
According to Ching Kwan Lee, "in May and June 1989, workers in
Beijing, Shanghai and other cities left the confines of factory gates and
their collective action took the forms of public protests, independent
unionism and political mobilization.,,82 She notes that workers detained
in the 1989 crackdown "receiv[ed] the heaviest [prison] sentences."83
Thus, the burgeoning workers' movement was central to the dynamic of
the 1989 events. Sporadic efforts to organize independent unions and
even political parties continued through the 1990s, but with leaders
almost invariably ending up in prison.
79 Ching Kwan Lee, Pathways of Labor Insurgency, in CHINESE SOCIETY:
CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 48 (Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Labor Insurgency].
80 Id. at 56, Lee notes the "Beijing students' disdainful stance towards workers'
participation in the TIananmen protests." Eventually, though, several students
became active leaders of the WAF movement.
81 Worker Passivity, supra note 78.
82 Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 49.
83 Id.
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In the late 1990s, however, widespread unrest began to reemerge
among workers responding to massive shutdowns of state industries. In
many instances these companies were being restructured with the crown
jewels of what remained being appropriated by party insiders. Most of
these protests were small (a few dozen or a few hundred at most). But
there have been some important exceptions. Chinese coal miners face
some of the most horrendous working conditions to be found in China
and have been heavily victimized by mine closures. The Labour Bulletin
report noted that "in 1999, the PLA was employed to put down a threeday protest by 20,000 miners in Liaoning province where miners were
reported to have taken over a town. "84 There were also steady reports in
the same time period of other "large-scale clashes between miners and
armed police over closures and wage arrears. ,,85
In the spring of 2002, as noted earlier, this unrest hit the famed
Daqing oil fields, where PetroChina had begun a massive downsizing
project after its IPO in 2000.86 Tens of thousands of workers took to the
streets there to protest an attempt by the regime to cut back on promised
severance benefits. The part the ACFfU played in these events
demonstrates its true role. Its representatives called the Daqing oil
workers protest "illegal and unacceptable" because according to the
ACFfU constitution new unions could only be established by existing
unions from above and not by workers themselves. It said that it had "no
role to play" in the battle by these workers for their pensions because of
official instructions they had received from the Communist Party
committee in the oil industry that their role was only to "understand" the
situation, not to advocate the workers' interests. In the words of the
ACFfU representative in Daqing: "[u]nder the union system in China,
the organizational relation of a union is defined by the party.... [T]he
trade union has a subordinate relationship to the Party, and a trade
union must be set up according to an organizational structure of
leadership that runs from top to bottom." Tiananmen Square veteran
union activist Han Dongfang issued a statement condemning the role
played by the ACFfU in the Daqing protest and urged the ACFfU to
recognize the right of the workers to organize their own union. For such
efforts in the past Han Dongfang has been condemned at the ILO's
84
85

Worker Passivity, supra note 78.
[d.

86 When the huge Daqing oil reserves were exploited during the reign of
Chairman Mao, the workers of Daqing were widely hailed as heroes. The oil workers
were the basis of a classic Stalinist labor emulation campaign as Mao told China to
"learn from Daqing" and rewarded so-called "Iron Man" Wang Jinxi for his
prodigious productivity. This approach to labor discipline originated in the Soviet
Union under the term Stakhanovism. John Gittings, Strikes Convulse China's Oi/Rich Heartlands, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2002 at 20.
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annual conference by China's representatives as a "criminal." Ching
Kwan Lee's research confirms the "ambiguous and conciliatory role
played by the local ACFTU."87 Even in the foreign investor-controlled
Special Economic Zones, where some western union advocates of a
rapprochement with the ACFfU feel it could act to genuinely defend
worker interests, "[u]nion officials were ... helpless in defending workers
during strikes in foreign-owned enterprises when public security
personnel were often called into the [company] compounds by
management to intimidate strikers."88 Indeed, Lee notes that the
widespread reports of high-density unionization rates in the foreign
enterprise sector largely reflect "ACFfU-approved unions [that] were
led and staffed by management personnel who were mainly responsible
for collecting union fees, organizing birthday parties and recreational
events. These union leaders were also salaried shop floor supervisors or
section heads in the factory administration. "89
A central theme of the state's behavior in the current period is to try
to placate pure economic demands (over issues such as severance pay)
while clamping down when the actions move to the formation of some
kind of independent workers' organization. Since repression of potential
unrest is so crucial, it is no surprise that until very recently the head of
the ACFfU, Wei lianxing, was the same government official who as a
member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's
seven member elite Politburo had been in charge of the regime's anticrime "Strike Hard" campaign. This campaign was aimed at suppressing
alleged corruption and led to widespread arrests and use of the death
penalty against thousands of party officials and businessmen. 9o Wei's
approach to independent unions could not be more clear. He views them
as "an attempt to 'westernize' and 'pluralize' us" by "our enemies, at
home and abroad" who "seek to overturn the leadership of the Party and
subvert the socialist system."91 The Labour Bulletin concluded its report
by noting that:
Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 51.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, China: One Thousand Executed in Strike Hard
Campaign Against Crime (July 2,1996), available at http://www.amnesty.it/news/1996/
31707196.htm (condemning campaign as "state killing on a massive scale" and
"widespread arbitrary violation of the most basic right to life"). A revival of this
approach is underway now in China. China Punishes 12,000 Criminals Involved in
Organized Crimes, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Beijing), March 11, 2002.
91 Wei, Jianxing, Conscientiously Implement the Spirit of the Fifth Plenary
Session of the 15th Central Committee and Speed Up the Organising and Establishing
of Trade Unions in New Enterprises, Address at Work Meeting on Organising and
Establishing Trade Unions in New Enterprises (Nov. 12, 2000), in Trini Leung,
ACFTU and Union Organizing, CHINA LAB. BULL., Apr. 2002.
87
88
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Where the state has definitely not adopted a "soft" approach
has been when labour organisers have attempted to take
advantage of the situation and set up labour organisations.
These are rarely actually in workplaces. Unemployment has
been such a major feature of recent economic trends that
many of the angry workers involved are protesting because
they have no workplaces to go to. The case of Hunan-based
independent trade unionist Zhang Shanguang is an example
of how brutal the regime can be in dealing with labour
organisers. While Zhang's association for laid off workers
was largely apolitical, the attempt to register the organisation
legally-on the back of China's signing of the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-was a
profoundly political act. Zhang Shanguang was locked up for
trying to organise the Shu Pu County Association for the
Rights of Laid Off Workers. Zhang has a history of labour
organising and in 1989 was sentenced for his involvement in
the Hunan Workers Autonomous Federation (HWAF). On
his release, he was blacklisted by employers and denied work.
In the more recent arrest, the police handed Zhang's wife an
official "Notice of Detention," which stated that Zhang was a
threat to national security and was being detained under
Article 61 of the Criminal Procedures Bill. After a secret
hearing lasting two hours, he was sentenced to 10 years.92
As in most authoritarian regimes the real fear is of independent
organization. A real trade union would rob the official state labor
organization of its legitimacy and thus would open the door to deeper
political change.
A real trade union movement in China could also have an important
economic, as well as political, effect. Economists have noted three major
macro-level imbalances in China today: limited domestic demand,
deflationary pressures and regional unevenness in the pattern of
development. A trade union movement would, through genuine
adversarial bargaining, force the regime to be more transparent and
balanced in its economic decision-making. Wages would increase, thus
stimulating domestic demand and price levels. This could lead to a more
balanced domestic development pattern but also weaken global tensions
with countries that already recognize trade unions. Financial analyst
Richard Duncan, for example, has recently called for the establishment
of a global minimum wage for workers in export industries as a means to
restore balance to the global economy, particularly because of the impact
of cheap labor in China: 93
92

93

Worker Passivity, supra note 78.
supra note 9, at 233.

DUNCAN,
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Increasing wages in the developing world would augment
global aggregate demand. It would succeed in putting more
money in people's pockets, something that traditional
monetary policy is incapable of doing in [the] post-bubble
environment [the world is now experiencing.] . . . As
consumption expanded in the newly industrializing countries,
so would demand for imported goods, an important
development that would help restore balanced trade in the
world. 94
But to make this argument about the impact of a genuine labor
movement in China is to point to a post-Communist China that is no
longer wed to the "race to the bottom" export-led model of growth and
that is precisely why the regime must resist in every conceivable forum
such a movement.
IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARENA

This concern for the wider political and economic impact of a real
trade union movement leads to the third area of concern: the role that
international legal institutions are playing in the process. Unfortunately,
rather than serve as a reminder of the importance of balance, equity and
accountability in a major socio-economic experiment like that occurring
in China today, these institutions are actually pushing the regime
forward. There are many explicit examples of this process when, for
example, the World Bank provides technical advice on the downsizing
and privatization of key industries. But just as problematic are those
steps taken at the WTO and the ILO that undermine the ability of
independent unions to emerge as counterweights to the muted form of
shock therapy now underway in China. The story of the granting of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China by the United States is
relatively well-known. 95 In doing so, the United States gave up one of its
most important levers of influence over the progress of labor rights and
human rights in China. Less well known, however, is the groundwork
that was laid for China's entry into the global economy at the ILO and
the WTO.
One of the important achievements of the international labor rights
movement over the last decade has been its promotion of the concept of
"core labor standards" that comprise those rights seen as essential to the
development of an effective trade union movement. This campaign has
given labor activists in many arenas the ability to push for a coherent
global agenda. Recognition of the core standards has now been made in
a variety of environments, though the precise content of the standards
94
95

DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 238.
See Bridging the Divide, supra note 18.
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varies slightly across institutional settings. In 1998 the ILO's
International Labour Conference, its central body made up of all its
member states together with worker and employer representatives,
issued a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
The Declaration stated that there are four fundamental rights which its
members had "an obligation... to respect, to promote and to realize,"
including: "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.,,96 Respect for these same principles is now found in the
emerging markets investment strategy of the California Public
Employees Retirement System ("CaIPERS"), the world's most
important institutional investor, and in the Generalized System of
Preferences in the global trade regime. 97 Even the WTO recognized its
members' obligation to foster respect for Core Labor Standards at its
Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996.98
But there is a catch. The ILO and the WTO each carved out an
exception to the core standards that flatly contradicts the central
principle of international labor solidarity that has guided the
international labor rights movement since the founding of the ILO in
1919. Paragraph 5 of the ILO's Fundamental Declaration states that:
The International Labour Conference ... Stresses that labour
standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes,
and that nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be
invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the
comparative advantage of any country should in no way be
called into question by this Declaration and its follow-up.
96 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session,
Geneva (June, 1998) available at http://www.ilo.orgipublic/english!standards/decU
declaration/textltindex.htm (last modified Dec. 8, 2000). The fundamental rights are
made up by eight fundamental ILO Conventions, including: 1) Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87); 2)
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); 3) Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); 4) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
(No. 105); 5) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.
111); 6) Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); 7) Minimum Age
Convention, 1973 (No. 138); 8) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.
182). INT'L LABOUR ORGANISATION, FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS, available at
http://www.ilo.orglpublic/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/index.htm (last
modified Oct. 20, 2000).
97 Press Release, CaIPERS, CalPERS Board Takes Action on Investment and
Other Measures, Nov. 15,2000, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/whatsnew/press/
200011115a.htm.
98 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, P4, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221.
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But labor standards are promulgated precisely because they are
protectionist: protective of the relatively advanced conditions won by
workers in economies with established trade unions. Many of these
protections were won only after bitter battle with employers and
governments alike. Thus, the Preamble to the ILO's Constitution,
drafted at the ILO's opening conference in 1919, states that "the failure
of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries."99 This concept of labor standards as a protective floor
beneath which the world should not fall was reaffirmed at the
Philadelphia Convention that restarted the ILO in the post-World War II
world. Thus, it was precisely the need to avoid the allegedly non-existent
"race to the bottom" in global labor standards that explains the very
origin of the ILO.
As former National Labor Relations Board Chair and leading labor
law scholar William B. Gould IV has pointed out, this principle of
international labor solidarity has a firm basis in domestic U.S. law.
The idea of unfair competition... is also reflected in portions
of the National Labor Relations Act's own preamble, enacted
to promote freedom of association and collective bargaining
in the Untied States shortly after the United States joined the
ILO . . . . Interestingly, in enacting the NLRA, Congress
announced that a primary purpose of this policy was to
remove the downward pressure on wages that a failure to
protect collective bargaining produces. tOO
It was no surprise, therefore, that the proposed carve-out language that
aimed to protect the cheap labor export model of growth found in
developing countries was the cause of bitter debate in the ILO during its
1998 Conference. The United States representative (from the Clinton
Administration) and the delegates representing the trade union
movement bitterly opposed the language, while many developing
countries, including China, pushed hard for it. If the leading United
Nations agency responsible for promoting global labor standards was
unable, or unwilling, to stand up to the pressures of globalizationtossing aside an 80-year-old core principle in favor of cheap labor and
the return of sweatshops-is it any surprise that the international labor
movement finds itself in such a challenging position?
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. XIII § I headnote, 225 Conso!. T.S. 188.
Gould, supra note 16, at 720. Oddly, Professor Gould seems to accept the
notion that Congress had it right about the impact of a race to the bottom on interstate
commerce in 1935 when it passed the NLRA but that the international labor
movement has now got it wrong in suggesting that the weight of hundreds of millions
of workers barely paid a subsistence wage are no longer an obstacle to the progressive
development of international commerce.
99

100
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As if to add insult to injury, in the summer of 2002, the ILO elevated
the representative of China's ACFfU to an alternate seat on the ILO's
Governing Body.I01 Apparently some ILO delegates attempted to justify
the vote, which meant that Israel's Histadrut would lose its seat, as a fair
protest of Ariel Sharon's policies towards the Palestinian people. The
China Labour Bulletin called this a "ploy" and stated that those who fell
for it "are guilty of confusion, at best, and [of] a serious lack of principle
at worst." Unfortunately, this move seemed to echo the attempt of some
in the international labor movement who have advocated a process of
"constructive engagement" with the ACFfU. 102 An argument that these
same activists dismissed with derision in the anti-apartheid movement is
now welcomed despite the lack of any evidence that such "engagement"
helps Chinese workers. The China Labour Bulletin condemns this
approach as "the creeping legitimation" of the ACFfU.
V.

GLOBAL LABOR'S ApPROACH TO CHINA

As might be expected, the international labor movement has largely
been very supportive of efforts to establish genuine, independent trade
unions in China. The ICFfU has been a strong supporter of workers'
rights in China, backing efforts to bring charges against the regime for
violation of such rights at bodies like the ILO and providing resources to
groups like the China Labour Bulletin and the Global Unions Liaison
Office, both in Hong Kong. I03 While the ICFfU's official "China Policy"
statement of November 2002 recognizes that there are different views on
how to approach China within the international labor movement, it notes
that "China violates human, religious and workers rights on a massive
scale, including the central enabling rights of freedom of association and
collective bargaining."I04 Further, in the face of these differences, the
ICFfU concluded that the ACFfU "is not an independent trade union
organization and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an authentic voice of
Chinese workers." It thus "reaffirm[ ed] its request to all affiliates and
Global Union Federations having contact with the Chinese authorities,
including the ACFfU, to engage in critical dialogue ... includ[ing] raising
101 Confusion at the ILO - China's Government Elected to Governing Body as. ..
Worker Delegate, CHINA LAB. BULL., June 19, 2002.
102 Id.
103 ICFfU SURVEY supra note 55; ICFTU Denounces Prison Sentences on Worker
Rights Activists, CHINA LAB. BULL., May 12, 2003; Press Release, Int'! Confederation
of Free Trade Unions, ILO Keeps Pressure on Several Anti-Union Governments,
(Apr. 4, 2003) available at http://www.icftu .. org/displaydocument.asp?Index=
991217407; Press Release, Int'! Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU China
Policy: ICFfU Executive Board, (Nov. 27-29, 2002) available at http://www.icftu.org/
displaydocument.asp?Index=991217172 [hereinafter ICFfU China Policy].
104 ICFTU China Policy, id.
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violations of fundamental workers' and trade union rights in any such
meetings, especially concerning detentions of trade union and labour
rights activists."lo5 Such a position of "critical" dialogue appears to lie
somewhere in the middle of the range of relationships now found within
international labor, which include everything from "no contacts" to
"constructive dialogue." The ICFfU defines "critical" dialogue as
including "raising violations of fundamental workers' and trade union
rights in any such meetings, especially concerning detention of trade
union and labour rights activists."I06
Somewhat surprisingly, however, some within the American labor
movement, where a "no contacts" viewpoint has largely driven labor
policy towards China, are now making an argument for a so-called
constructive dialogue with the ACFfU that is precisely the kind of effort
that so concerns the China Labour Bulletin about the possible "creeping
legitimation" of that state body. Kent Wong, an American labor lawyer
and former official of the Service Employees International Union and
currently director of the UCLA Center for Labor Research and
Education, Elaine Bernard, Executive Director of the Harvard
University Trade Union Program and Gregory Mantsios of the Worker
Education Center at Queens College of the City University of New York,
have all recently advocated that the AFL-CIO should recognize the
ACFfU.!07
In the spring of 2002, Mantsios led a trip of U.S. academics and
labor educators to China to meet with the ACFfU. He later issued a
report calling for its recognition. lOS Despite the evidence presented
consistently over the last decade by Han Dongfang and other human
rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, Mantsios argued that the "ACFfU is an important advocate on
behalf of [Chinese] workers. "109 A review of the report indicates that this
delegation may have violated the ICFfU's official policy of critical
dialogue with the ACFfU if and when such contact does take place,
though admittedly that policy was only put in place after this particular
trip. The Mantsios trip was undertaken "at the invitation" of the
ACFfU and the delegation was "escorted throughout [their] trip" by the
Deputy Head of the ACFfU's international department. llo Thus, there
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
107 Wong & Bernard, supra note 13; Leigh Jenkins, US unions resume talks after 20
years, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 27, 2002; Gregory Mantsios, Tea for Two:
Chinese and
Labor: A Report from China, FalllWinter 2002, NEW LAB. F. 61
[hereinafter Mantsios Report].
108 Mantsios Report, id. at 15.
109 [d. at 7.
110 [d. at 1.
105

106

u.s.
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should be some initial concern that the information presented to the
delegation was filtered to favor the Chinese government and that
delegation members were not free to engage in an open dialogue with
any Chinese workers they may have encountered. Indeed, Mantsios
admits that "[b]ecause the delegation was visiting China at the invitation
of the ACITU, we did not meet with independent trade unionists, nor
did we request to do so." The delegation "tried to compensate" for this
deficit "by reviewing material written by independent activists." Of
course, such material is widely available from organizations like the
China Labour Bulletin, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
and would hardly justify a trip to China.
Clearly the delegation had another goal. As Mantsios reports, "our
purpose ... was twofold: 1) to improve mutual understanding of our
respective labor movements, and 2) to explore ways in which relations
between the Chinese and U.S. labor unions could be improved." Thus,
from the outset, before the delegation even left the United States, it had
already concluded that the ACITU constitutes a genuine labor
movement. The trip, then, had a political goal, not a research or
legitimate educational aim, despite having been organized by the
university-based director of a worker education program and including in
the delegation Kent Wong of UCLA, Elaine Bernard of Harvard, and
Ruth Milkman, a UCLA sociology professor and Director of the newly
established Institute of Labor and Employment at the University of
California.
The Mantsios Report ignores, sidesteps or outright contradicts what
is widely known about the status of worker rights and the role of the
ACFfU in China today. At one point, for example, it states that
"China's international agreements as well as its domestic labor and trade
union laws provide important rights and protections. Workers in China
have the right to join a union, to elect and remove union leaders
democratically, and to strike against an employer.'>111 The only source for
these almost laughable conclusions is a reference to the recent
ratification by China of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and a note that "other union rights are embedded in
China's Trade Union Law, revised in 2001."112
What do these laws actually indicate? Since the ACFfU exists to
defend the interests of the state it cannot, of course, be called a genuine
trade union and that is the conclusion reached by the ICFfU in its China
Policy Statement promulgated in late 2002. By law, the ACFfU enjoys a
legal monopoly;113 there are no legally protected union alternatives for
111
112
113

Id. at 9.
Id. at 17.
See discussion supra note 58.

HeinOnline -- 10 U. C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 70 2003-2004

2003]

The "Race to the Bottom" Returns

71

Chinese workers. Efforts to form alternatives to the ACFfU have been
met consistently with the full force of state power. The Trade Union
Law, instead of protecting the freedom of association, establishes a strict
organizational hierarchy which requires each level of union organization
in the country to submit to the will of the next higher level of
organization, culminating in the ACFfU, "which shall be established as
the unified national organization.,,114
In fact, all of the sections of the Chinese labor organization are
mandated to follow "the principle of democratic centralism," a hallmark
of undemocratic Stalinist regimes.ll5 While the Law states that worker
assemblies "shall have the right to remove or recall" 116 union
representatives, the "trade union organization at a higher level shall
exercise leadership over a trade union organization at a lower level. 'H17
Further, new local unions can only be established with the "approval" of
"the trade union organization at the next higher level.,,118 Finally, union
financial resources are controlled jointly by the ACFfU and the Chinese
state. 119 Thus, the China Labour Bulletin concluded that "[i]ndependent
trade unionists in China will find nothing to celebrate in [the new]
legislation that guarantees the finances of an official trade union with a
legal monopoly on organising. 'H2O
The Trade Union Law does not contain any mention of the right to
strike, and the explicit affirmation of this right once found in the Chinese
constitution was deleted in 1982. As the ICFfU concluded in its 2003
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, "the right to strike
was removed from China's Constitution in 1982 on the grounds that the
political system in place had 'eradicated problems between the
proletariat and enterprise owners."H21 In fact, according to one leading
scholar of the Chinese labor movement, the elimination of the right to
strike was a reaction by the regime to a wildcat strike wave that hit China
in the wake of the emergence of Polish Solidarity in 1980 and 1981. 122
Instead, China's Labor Law only provides that "where a labour
dispute ... takes place, the parties concerned may apply for mediation or
114 See arts. 9-12, Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China (2001),
Adopted at the 5th Session of the 7th National People's Congress on Apr. 3, 1992,
amended in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Trade Union Law of the
PRC made at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th National
People's Congress on Oct. 27, 2001.
115 See id. art. 9.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See id. art. II.
119 See id. art. 42-44.
120 Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, supra note 7I.
121 lCFIU SURVEY supra note 57.
122 Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 49.
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arbitration or take legal proceedings according to law, or may seek for a
settlement through arbitration. "123
It is true that the ICESCR does recognize both the right of
individuals "to form trade unions and join the trade union of his
choice ... [and] the right to strike."124 China ratified the ICESCR in 200l.
However, the right to strike in the ICESCR is limited by a proviso which
states that the right exists "provided that it is exercised in conformity
with the laws of the particular country." Given the severe constraint on
the right to strike in China in law and practice it seems unlikely that any
worker can hope to take refuge in the ICESCR. Even if one could read
the ICESCR to override the absence of the right to strike inside China, it
is not a self-executing agreement and thus does not automatically
become law inside China upon ratification but explicitly requires China
"to take steps. . . including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant."125 Far from taking such
steps, China appears to have moved away from its apparent commitment
to genuine trade union freedom. Mantsios' sweeping conclusion that the
right to strike actually exists in China by virtue of the ICESCR and the
Trade Union Law is thus unwarranted. Further, upon joining the
ICESCR, China issued a specific reservation, as it is allowed to do under
international law, that "the application of Article 8.1 (a) [the right of
workers to form trade unions and join unions of their own choice] of the
Covenant to the People's Republic of China shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China,
Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China and Labor Law of
the People's Republic of China. 'H26 Thus, the monopoly of the ACFfU
has been explicitly preserved.
In the fall of 2002, following the release of the Mantsios Report,
UCLA's Kent Wong also led a trip to China, bringing with him, among
others, Andy Stern, the President of the Service Employees International
Union, and Tom Rankin, President of the California Labor Federation.
This group met only with ACFfU representatives, not with independent
union activists. A report on the visit appeared in the South China
Morning Post in which Kent Wong called for a "dialogue" with the
ACFfU and argued that "reopening lines of communication" would
123 Sec. 77, Ch. X, Labor Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the
8th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on Jui.
5, 1994, promulgated by Order No. 28 of the President of the People's Republic of
China on Jui. 5, 1994, and effective as of Jan. 1, 1995. (Emphasis added.)
124 ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 8.
125 ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 2.
126 Declarations and Reservations, International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Feb. 5, 2002, U.N. Treaty Collection (on file with author).
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"better serve the interests of U.S. companies" investing in China.127
These statements received a quick and sharp rebuke from Barbara
Shailor, the director of the AFL-CIO's Department of International
Affairs, who wrote a letter to the editor of the Morning Post stating that
the Wong-led group was not an official AFL-CIO delegation and that the
AFL-CIO shares the official view of the international labor movement
that "the ACFfU is not an independent trade union but rather part of
the Chinese government and party structure."128
The viewpoint of Wong, Bernard and Mantsios has yet to gain wider
traction in the American labor movement but it is symbolic of the
intellectual problem that the current situation poses. A detailed analysis
of the pitfalls of "constructive engagement" by organized labor with
authoritarian regimes was undertaken by the International Union of
Foodworkers, the official international body representing union
organizations in the food industry, in 1997. An IUF Mission to Hong
Kong and China, which did meet with many independent Chinese
unionists, reached very different conclusions than these individuals.
Consistent with the analysis presented here, which indeed relies in part
on the work of the IUF Mission, the Mission noted that, first, "the
ACFfU remains a subordinate organisation under tight party control,
with no autonomy whatsoever"129 and therefore a "dialogue between the
ICFfU (or any other democratic trade union organization, also at
national level) and the ACFfU is not a dialogue between two trade
union organisations but between a trade union organisation on the one
hand and a state organization on the other.»130 Furthermore, the IUF
Mission concluded that "[a]ll informed observers concur that there is no
possibility of the ACFfU evolving into an independent organisation by
itself. . .. [T]here would have to be serious division in the party and the
emergence of a strong reformist-progressive tendency prevailing over the
party conservatives... it is certainly not visiting foreign trade unionists
who will influence the outcome of such political struggles. "131 Given this
likely stasis in the character of the ACFfU, the "China issue is too
important and it [is] too complex to be handled by persons unprepared
for the task. Participants in delegations have to take the time to be
briefed in depth. . . . Chinese democratic trade unionists [including the
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and Han Dongfang of the
China Labour Bulletin] as well as NGOs with specific relevant expertise,
should be involved in preparing any dialogue and in the discussions
127 Jenkins, supra note 107.
128 Barbara Shailor, Letter to the Editor, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (on file
with author).
129 IUF MISSION TO CHINA, supra note 68, at 29.
130 Id. at 39.
131 Id. at 30.
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themselves."132 Finally, the Mission concluded that "[flull support,
politically and financially, should be extended to Han Dongfang and
other Chinese democratic trade unionists, by the ICFTU, ITSs
(International Trade Union Secretariats) and national trade union
organisations in a position to do SO.,,133
Unfortunately, these core conclusions of a major international labor
body appear to have been either readily ignored or violated by both the
Mantsios and Wong delegations. In the face of widespread evidence they
argued that the ACFTU is a genuine trade union and brushed aside the
political situation in China today. They ignored Han Dongfang and
consciously chose not to meet with dissident labor activists, while shaking
the hands of those very individuals who are responsible for the
repression of a genuine labor movement in China today. In light of the
vigorous efforts of many thousands, if not millions, of Chinese workers
such as Xiao Yunliang and Yao Fuxin to express their basic human rights
to freedom of speech and association, it seems tragic that those in a
position most capable of providing them support and encouragement at
this crucial turning point in Chinese history willfully ignore them and,
instead, present a distorted picture of Chinese reality to the outside
world. An alternative view must be articulated if Chinese and western
workers are to join together to reverse the "race to the bottom."

132
133

[d. at 40.
[d. at 42.
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